Most power transmission networks are connected to neighbouring networks. Since system frequency is shared on all voltage levels, power system reliability is considered to be a common good. That is, a non-excludable but rival good. This means that a MW of power can only be used once and that it is technologically difficult to prevent interconnected Transmission System Operators (TSOs) from using more than they provide. Underprovision of reserves in one TSO zone could thus lead to a widespread blackout throughout the synchronous area. To prevent this `Tragedy of the Commons', all TSOs in a synchronous area are obliged to provide sufficient reserves.
The network code distinguishes two degrees of cross-border balancing cooperation: 'exchange of reserves' and 'reserves sharing'. Exchange of reserves makes it possible to procure part of the required level of reserves in adjacent TSO zones, while reserves sharing allows multiple TSOs to take into account the same reserves to meet their reserve requirements. Exchange of reserves only allows cost arbitrage (A), while reserves sharing allows both cost arbitrage and variance-reducing pooling of reserve needs (A)+(B).
The second part of the paper departs from the aggregate analysis of cross-border cooperation and considers the individual costs of cooperating TSOs. TSOs only cooperate if it decreases their procurement costs, while not endangering the reliability of their TSO zone. We show how individual balancing and interruption costs depend on the procurement payment method and the rationing priority rules used. Whenever more side-payments are required, cooperation tends to be more difficult.
Methods
Our model studies reserves sharing and exchange between two TSO zones = 1,2. The need for reserves in TSO zone at a certain instant is [MW] . This is the real-time imbalance due to a combination of forecast errors of demand and intermittent supply, and failures of generation capacity or transmission components. We denote the joint probability density function of the reserve needs by ( 1 , 2 ); 1 and 2 are assumed to be non-negatively correlated and jointly normal with known parameters. The TSO's variable of choice is
[MW], the quantity of reserves procured. Costs of procuring MW of reserve capacity in TSO zone are given by ( ), with increasing, smooth and convex. Interruption costs are linear in the quantity of energy not supplied to customers.
The order of events in the model is as follows:
1. The TSO at node chooses ex ante how much reserve capacity to procure and pays a procurement payment to balancing service providers in its own region and to neighbouring TSOs. 2. In real time the actual need for reserves is observed in each zone . 3. The procured reserves are used to accommodate the reserve needs. In case local reserves are insufficient, TSOs will use exchanged or shared reserves, or ration consumers.
This model analytically derives the optimal procurement of reserve capacity, and the resulting procurement and interruption costs, for both TSO zones for three regimes: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. In addition, we show how individual balancing and interruption costs depend on the procurement payment method (pay-as-bid vs. pay-as-cleared, capacity vs. energy payments, and use of unshared bids) and the rationing priority rules (reserves-providing vs. reserves-receiving TSO priority) used.
Results
Figure 1 shows that the benefits increase when reserve procurement costs become more asymmetric and reserve needs are less correlated. With low cost asymmetry and low correlation, reserves sharing yields the major part of the cost reduction, while with high cost asymmetry and a high correlation, reserves exchange yields the major part of the cost reduction.
With symmetric costs and high correlation, crossborder cooperation in reserves yields very little benefits. Lastly, with reserves sharing procured reserves decrease with decreasing correlation. Table 1 shows individual procurement and interruption costs for both TSO zones for a pay-ascleared capacity auction and rationing priority for the reserves-providing TSO. Implementing these rules makes reserves exchange an improvement for the expensive TSO but not for the inexpensive one. However, with rationing priority for the reservesproviding TSO and a low correlation, sharing is Pareto-improving. That is, both TSOs face lower costs. 
Conclusions
This paper compares three degrees of TSO cooperation in generation reserves provision: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. We derive analytically the optimal procurement of reserves in each of the three cases and show that costs decrease with cooperation. The benefits of reserves exchange and reserves sharing depend on cost asymmetry and correlation of reserve needs between the TSO zones. When TSO zones have highly asymmetric costs and highly correlated reserve needs, reserves exchange already yields large cost reduction. When TSO zones have fairly equal reserve procurement costs but a low degree of reserve needs correlation, reserves sharing is needed to reap the full benefits of TSO reserves cooperation. Lastly, the individual procurement and interruption costs depend on the procurement payment and rationing priority rules used by the cooperating TSOs.
